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Abstract
In this paper, we employ the agent-based macroeconomic Eurace@Unibi
model to study the economic implications of diﬀerent degrees of de-centrali-
zation in the wage setting. Starting from a baseline scenario, corresponding
to a high degree of unionization, in which wages are fully centralized and
indexed on economy-wide productivity gains and inﬂation, we investigate
how an increasing level of de-centralization aﬀects the dynamics of output,
employment, inequality, and market concentration. We think of decentral-
ization as wages being a weighted average of an economy-wide `union wage'
and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component depending on the ﬁrm's productivity and the
experienced tightness of the labor market. Our ﬁndings suggest that stronger
centralization of the wage setting process induces lower wage inequality and
stronger concentration on the consumption good market. Furthermore, due
to more physical investments, an economy with more centralized wage set-
ting is characterized by higher productivity and faster economic growth.
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1 Introduction
One of the key challenges economic policy makers face is to foster economic growth
while at the same time keeping the dynamics of (income) inequality in focus.
Clearly, the evolution of income inequality is closely connected to the dynamics
of wage distributions, and recent empirical work (e.g. Card et al., 2013; Barth
et al., 2016) highlights that the increase in heterogeneity of wages across ﬁrms (re-
spectively plants) is the most important factor driving increasing wage dispersion.
Concurrently, the last decades have been characterized by a decline in the degree
of unionization in many industrialized countries (see, e.g., Ebbinghaus and Visser,
1999; Visser, 2006; Firpo et al., 2018) and also institutional changes towards more
decentralized wage setting on the ﬁrm-level in countries like Germany (Dustmann
et al., 2014). The general narrative in this respect is that although these devel-
opments seem to contribute to an increase in wage inequality, they increase the
ﬁrms' competitiveness and thereby foster (local) economic growth.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of a decentralization of the wage setting
both on economic growth and on the evolution of wage inequality in a dynamic
macroeconomic model. The model captures the competition between ﬁrms, both,
on the labor and the consumption goods market as well as potential demand eﬀects
induced by diﬀerent wage-setting regimes. Furthermore, productivity dynamics in
our model are driven by endogenous technology choices of investing ﬁrms, such
that we can study how the wage setting regime inﬂuences investment and the
speed of adoption of new technologies, and how these processes interact with the
endogenously emerging dynamics of industry concentration.
Existing models comparing the implications of centralized versus de-centralized
wage setting have to a large extent relied on models with static oligopoly-type prod-
uct market interaction (Haucap and Wey, 2004; Blomgren-Hansen, 2012) or have
completely abstracted from product market competition between ﬁrms (Moene and
Wallerstein, 1997; Vona and Zamparelli, 2014). In an inﬂuential early contribution
Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) provide an analysis of the eﬀect of (de-)centralization
of wage bargaining in a setting with several industries with perfect competition in
each industry and output of the industries being partial substitutes on the prod-
uct market. They assume that demand is ﬁxed independent from the households
wage income and establish that under certain conditions there is a hump-shaped
(inverse hump-shaped) relationship between the degree of centralization of wage
bargaining and the average wage level (employment).1 With the exception of
Moene and Wallerstein (1997) all the mentioned studies take a static perspective
without considering how diﬀerent wage setting regimes inﬂuence the ﬁrms' invest-
ment decisions and technology choices.2 Moene and Wallerstein (1997), focusing
1See Driﬃll (2006) for a survey of the stream of literature building on this analysis.
2Several papers have studied from a theoretical perspective the implications of centralization
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entirely on the competition between ﬁrms on the labor market, show that in the
absence of product market competition more centralized wage setting yields higher
ﬁrm productivity but lower employment compared to de-centralized bargaining of
wages.
Our perspective in this paper is that the dynamics of output and wage distribu-
tions are crucially driven by the interplay between technological change, evolution
of industry structure, and the dynamics on the labor market. Hence, we aim
to gain a better understanding of how diﬀerent wage setting regimes inﬂuence
this interplay. In order to capture these eﬀects, we carry out our analysis in the
framework of the macroeconomic agent-based Eurace@Unibi model (see Dawid
et al., 2019). This model, building on the original Eurace model (see Deissenberg
et al., 2008), combines explicit representations of the dynamic competition be-
tween ﬁrms on the labor and product market in a closed macroeconomic setting
with endogenous technology choices of ﬁrms and endogenous determination of de-
mand. It has strong empirical micro-foundations for the agents' behavioral rules
(Dawid et al., 2019), and has also been shown to be able to reproduce a large set
of empirical stylized facts (e.g., Dawid et al., 2018b). The model has been used
as a framework for policy analysis in diﬀerent policy domains (see Dawid et al.,
2018a; Deissenberg and van der Hoog, 2011), and has proved useful in understand-
ing implications of diﬀerent degrees of labor market ﬂexibility (Dawid et al., 2014)
and dynamic mechanisms determining wage inequality (Dawid and Gemkow, 2014;
Dawid et al., 2018b). More generally, our analysis contributes to the growing liter-
ature on agent-based macroeconomics (see Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018), in which
recently several papers have considered macroeconomic eﬀects of the institutional
setup in the labor market (Dosi et al., 2017, 2018; Caiani et al., 2019), and the
literature on the agent-based analysis of labor market dynamics (see Neugart and
Richiardi, 2018).
The starting point of our analysis is an economy with a workforce with (ex-
ante) uniform skills. There is a fully centralized wage setting, where workers
have a uniform wage, labeled as union wage, which is updated over time taking
into account inﬂation and average productivity growth in the economy. We then
compare the dynamics emerging in such a setting with scenarios, in which at some
given point in time the binding power of the centrally determined union wage is
reduced and ﬁrms have the option to oﬀer individual wages, which deviate from
collectively agreed wage, to job candidates. More precisely, we assume that wage
oﬀers made to applicants are a weighted average of the centralized wage and a
ﬁrm speciﬁc wage oﬀer, which is determined according to a wage setting rule that
of wage bargaining on ﬁrms' innovation incentives (e.g. Haucap and Wey, 2004; Mukherjee
and Pennings, 2011; Basak and Mukherjee, 2018), however this stream of literature focuses on
hold-up issues ﬁrms face when bargaining with labor unions after investment and, therefore, is
quite distinct from our agenda in this paper.
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takes into account the expected productivity of the worker and the frequency
with which the ﬁrm has been rationed on the labor market in the past.3 The
weight on the union wage then decreases during a transition phase till a certain
long run degree of wage centralization is reached. We interpret this process as a
reduced form representation of a de-unionization of the workforce or changes in the
institutional setup of the labor market, which allows for ﬁrm speciﬁc agreements
that deviate from outcomes of industry wide bargaining. The long run weight the
union wage has in the workers' individual wages captures how strong the degree
of de-unionization respectively the ﬂexibility in local ﬁrm-level wage agreements
are. In our experiments, we vary this long run weight from a value of one, which
corresponds to the benchmark of fully centralized wage setting throughout to a
value of zero, which implies that in the long run wages are fully decentralized and
ﬁrm speciﬁc.
We ﬁnd that in the considered setting a centralized determination of wages
does not only reduce wage and income inequality, but also induces faster growth
in output and productivity in the economy, compared to scenarios with more
decentralized wage setting. The main driving force underlying these results is
that under centralized wage setting ﬁrms that already perform well proﬁt from
a uniform wage in terms of lower unit labor costs. These translate into lower
prices they can charge compared to their competitors which increases their market
share and spurs further investments. Hence, average productivity and output in
the economy grow faster than with a de-centralized wage setting where individual
market shares of ﬁrms are more volatile and investment behavior is spread among
a larger fraction of ﬁrms and overall lower.
Although these ﬁndings about the positive dynamic eﬀects of wage central-
ization clearly should be seen in the context of the assumptions underlying our
experiments, for example the homogeneity of workers with respect to their general
skills, our analysis highlights several channels through which the degree of central-
ization aﬀects economic dynamics, which so far have not been recognized in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief description of
the structure of the Eurace@Unibi model with particular focus on the wage setting
mechanism and the aspects that are diﬀerent in this paper from the standard
version of the model. The setup of our simulation experiment as well as the
results of our analysis are discussed in Section 3. Concluding remarks are given in
Section 4, and in the Appendix we provide the parameter setting underlying our
analysis.
3The rule determining the ﬁrm speciﬁc wage component corresponds exactly to the wage
setting rule used in the standard version of the Eurace@Unibi model as documented in Dawid
et al. (2019).
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2 The Model
2.1 Overall Structure
In a nutshell, the Eurace@Unibi model describes an economy with an investment
and a consumption goods sector, and a labor, a ﬁnancial, and a credit market
in a regional context. Capital good ﬁrms provide investment goods of diﬀerent
vintages and productivities. Consumption good ﬁrms combine capital and labor
of varying degrees of general and speciﬁc skills to produce a consumption good that
households purchase. Households' saved income goes into the credit and ﬁnancial
markets through which it is channeled to ﬁrms ﬁnancing the production of goods.
In this paper, we use a one-region setup of the Eurace@Unibi model to analyze
the economic implications of diﬀerent levels of wage centralization, where in the
standard version of the model, the wage setting is fully decentralized. More pre-
cisely, the wages of workers are determined at the ﬁrm level, on the one hand, by
the expectation at the time of hiring the employer has about the level of speciﬁc
skills of the worker, and, on the other hand, by a base wage variable. The base
wage is driven by the (past) tightness of the labor market and determines the
overall level of wages paid by a particular employer.
In order to address aspects of wage centralization, we extend the Eurace@Unibi
model by modifying the wage setting protocol of the labor market. In particular,
we introduce a labor union that determines a collective wage proposal. This union
wage is adjusted over time, on the one hand, in order to compensate for inﬂation
and, on the other hand, to claim a share of the economy-wide productivity gains
to the workers. The wage bargaining between ﬁrms and the union is modeled
in reduced form by assuming that the actual wage that a ﬁrm has to pay is a
linear combination of the centralized union wage and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage. The
weight used in the linear combination is thereby an exogenous model parameter and
reﬂects the power of the union in the wage negotiation. Since it also determines
the degree of wage centralization, we will employ this parameter as the policy
parameter in our analysis.
A complete description of the model is provided in Dawid et al. (2019). Due to
space constraints here no full treatment of the model is given. Rather, we describe
only the main aspects of the model, which are crucial for the understanding of the
mechanisms driving the policy results discussed below.4
Capital goods of diﬀerent quality are provided by capital goods producers with
inﬁnite supply. The technological frontier (i.e. the quality of the best currently
available capital good) improves over time, where technological change is driven
by a stochastic (innovation) process. Firms in the consumption goods sector use
4Note that the description of the model provided here is to a large extend identical to the
ones given in Dawid et al. (2018c,b).
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capital goods combined with labor input to produce consumption goods. The la-
bor market is populated with workers that acquire speciﬁc skills on the job, which
they need to fully exploit the technological advantages of the capital employed in
the production process. Every time when consumption goods producers invest in
new capital goods they decide which quality of capital goods to select, thereby
determining the speed by which new technologies spread in the economy. Con-
sumption goods are sold at a central market platform (called mall), where ﬁrms
store and oﬀer their products and consumers come to buy goods at posted prices.
Labor market interaction is described by a simple multi-round search-and-
matching procedure where ﬁrms post vacancies, searching workers apply, ﬁrms
make oﬀers and workers accept/reject. Banks collect deposits from households
and ﬁrms and give credits to ﬁrms. The interest that ﬁrms have to pay on the
amount of their loan depends on the ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm, and the amount
of the loan might be restricted by the bank's liquidity and risk exposure. There is
a ﬁnancial market where shares of a single asset are traded, namely an index bond
containing all ﬁrms in the economy. The allocation of dividends to households is,
therefore, determined by the wealth of households in terms of their stock of index
bonds. The dividend paid by each share at a certain point in time is given by
the sum of the dividends currently paid by all ﬁrms. The central bank provides
standing facilities for the banks at a given base rate, pays interest on banks'
overnight deposits and might provide ﬁat money to the government. Finally, the
government collects income and proﬁt taxes at ﬁxed rates and pays out social
beneﬁts to unemployed households.
Firms that are not able to pay the ﬁnancial commitments declare illiquidity.
Furthermore, if the ﬁrm has negative net worth at the end of the production cycle
insolvency bankruptcy is declared. In both cases it goes out of business, stops
all productive activities, and all employees loose their jobs. The ﬁrm writes oﬀ a
fraction of its debt with all banks with which it has a loan and stays idle for a
certain period before it becomes active again.
The choice of the decision rules in the Eurace@Unibi model is based on a sys-
tematic attempt to incorporate rules that resemble empirically observable behavior
documented in the relevant literature. Concerning households, this means, for ex-
ample, that empirically identiﬁed saving rules are used. Furthermore, purchasing
choices are described using models from the Marketing literature with strong em-
pirical support. In particular, in several parts of the model, decision makers are
described by logit models. These models are well suited to capture decisions where
individuals try to maximize some objective function which depends on some vari-
ables common to all decision makers and are explicitly represented in the model,
as well as on aspects that are idiosyncratic to each decision maker and captured
in the model by a stochastic term. With respect to ﬁrm behavior we follow the
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'Management Science Approach', which aims at implementing relatively simple
decision rules that match standard procedures of real world ﬁrms as described
in the corresponding management literature. A more extensive discussion of the
Management Science approach can be found in Dawid and Harting (2012).
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can follow
either subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the economic activ-
ities take place on a hierarchy of time-scales: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily
activities all take place following calendar-time or subjective agent-time. Agents
are activated asynchronously according to their subjective time schedules that is
anchored on an individual activation day. These activation days are uniformly ran-
domly distributed among the agents at the start of the simulation, but may change
endogenously (e.g., when a household gets re-employed, its subjective month gets
synchronized with the activation day of its employer due to wage payments). This
modeling approach is supposed to capture the decentralized and typically asyn-
chronous nature of decision making processes and activities of economic agents.
2.2 Agents, Markets, and Decisions
2.2.1 Output Decision and Production
Consumption goods producers need physical capital and labor for production.
A ﬁrm i has a capital stock Ki,t that is composed of diﬀerent vintages v with
v = 1, ..., Vt, where Vt denotes the number of available vintages a time t. The
accumulation of physical capital by a consumption goods producer follows
Kvi,t+1 = (1− δ)Kvi,t + Ivi,t (1)
where δ is the depreciation rate and Ivi,t ≥ 0 is the gross investment in vintage v.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented by
a Leontief type production function with complementarities between the qualities
of the diﬀerent vintages of the capital good and the speciﬁc skill level of employees
for using these vintages. Vintages are deployed for production in descending order
by using the best vintage ﬁrst. For each vintage the eﬀective productivity is deter-
mined by the minimum of its productivity and the average level of relevant speciﬁc
skills of the workers. Accordingly, output for a consumption goods producer i at
time t is given by
Qi,t =
Vt∑
v=1
min
[
Kvi,t,max
[
0, Li,t −
Vt∑
k=v+1
Kki,t
]]
·min [Av, Bi,t] , (2)
where Li,t is labor input, A
v is the productivity of vintage v and Bi,t denotes the
average speciﬁc skill level in ﬁrms as explained in more detail in Section 2.2.3.
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The fact that the considered production function takes into account the vintage
structure of the capital stock and that ﬁrms select among diﬀerent available vin-
tages enables us to capture the eﬀect of workers' skills on the incentives of ﬁrms
to invest into new technologies (see Section 2.2.4).
Once every month each ﬁrm determines the quantities to be produced and de-
livered to the mall. Actual demand for the product of a ﬁrm in a given month
is stochastic (see below) and there are stock-out costs, because consumers intend-
ing to buy the product of a ﬁrm move on to buy from a diﬀerent producer in
case the ﬁrm's stock at the mall is empty. Therefore, the ﬁrm faces a produc-
tion planning problem with stochastic demand and stock-out cost. The simplest
standard heuristic used in the corresponding Operations Management literature
prescribes to generate an estimation of the distribution of demand and then choose
the planned stock level after delivery such that the (estimated) stock-out probabil-
ity during the following month equals a given parameter value which is inﬂuenced
by stock-out costs, inventory costs and risk attitude of the ﬁrm (see, e.g., Sil-
ver et al., 1998). Firms in the Eurace@Unibi model follow this simple heuristic,
thereby generating a target production quantity for the considered month. Based
on the target production quantity the ﬁrm determines the desired input quantities
of physical capital and labor. Realizing this production plan might induce the need
to buy new physical capital, hire new labor or to obtain additional credit. The
ﬁrm might be rationed on the labor and credit market, in which case it adjusts its
production quantity downwards.
2.2.2 Pricing Decision
Consumption goods producers set the price of their products once a year which
is consistent with empirical observations (see, e.g., Fabiani et al., 2006). The
pricing rule is inspired by the price setting described in Nagle et al. (2011, ch.6),
a standard volume on strategic pricing in the Managerial literature. Firms seek
for a proﬁt-maximizing price taking into account the trade-oﬀ between price, sales
and costs.
To obtain an indication of the eﬀect of price changes on sales the consump-
tion goods producers carry out simulated purchase surveys (see Nagle et al., 2011,
pp. 304). A representative sample of households is asked to compare a ﬁrm's
product with the set of the currently available rival products for a range of prices.
Households' answers are based on the same decision rules they use for their real
purchasing decisions. Based on the resulting demand estimations and cost consid-
erations ﬁrms choose the price which maximizes their expected discounted proﬁt
stream over their planning horizons.
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2.2.3 Adjustment of Speciﬁc Skills of Workers
The productivity of a worker h is determined by an endogenously increasing speciﬁc
skill level bh,t. It is assumed that during the hiring process the speciﬁc skills of job
candidates cannot be observed by potential employers. They become observable
during the production process. Workers increase the speciﬁc skills over time during
production by a learning process. The speed of learning depends on the average
quality of the technology Ai,t used by employer i:
bh,t+1 = bh,t + χ
S ·max[0, Ai,t − bh,t]. (3)
Here bh,t are the speciﬁc skills of worker h in period t and 0 < χ < 1 denotes the
speed of adjustment of speciﬁc skills.5
2.2.4 Technological Change
The supply of the capital goods and the process of technological change is modeled
in a very simpliﬁed way. We recur to a single capital good producer that oﬀers
diﬀerent vintages of the capital good v = 1, ..., Vt that have distinct productivities
Av. Alternatively, our representation of the supply of capital goods can be inter-
preted as a market with monopolistic competition structure, where each vintage
is oﬀered by a single ﬁrm, which uses the pricing rule described below.
New vintages become available over time following a stochastic process. To
avoid spurious growth eﬀects, due to stochastic diﬀerences in the dynamics of the
technological frontier between runs, we use identical realizations of the stochastic
process governing the emergence of new vintages in all runs.
To keep the description of this sector as simple as possible, no explicit repre-
sentation of the production process and of the needed input factors is introduced.
To account for the cost dynamics, it is assumed that the main factor of production
costs is the wage bill and, since wages increase on average with the same rate as
productivity grows (see Subsection 2.2.6), the growth rate of productivity is used
as a proxy for the increase in production costs of the capital goods.
The pricing of the vintages pv,t is modeled as a combination of cost-based p
cost
t
and value-based prices pvaluev,t (see, e.g., Nagle et al., 2011):
pv,t = (1− λ)pcostt + λpvaluev,t . (4)
Due to our assumption above, pcostt increases with the average productivity of the
economy. For the value-based price component the average general and speciﬁc
5In the general version of the model heterogeneity of the learning speed across individuals
is captured and it is assumed that the speed of adjustment positively depends on the level of
general skills (see Dawid et al., 2018d). In the context of the policy analysis in this paper we
abstract from the explicit representation of the heterogeneity of general skills.
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skills in the economy are determined ﬁrst. In a next step the discounted pro-
ductivities for each vintage are calculated for a ﬁrm that employs workers whose
human capital is equal to the average of the economy. The value-based part pvaluev,t
is proportional to this estimated eﬀective productivity of the vintage. The moti-
vation for this rule is that the capital good producer tries to estimate the value of
each vintage, in terms of eﬀective productivity, for its average customer. Further-
more, it is assumed that the capital good producer is able to deliver any demanded
quantity of any vintage.
The reason why we choose such a simpliﬁed representation of the capital goods
sector is our focus on the interaction of labor market and consumption goods mar-
ket dynamics. Therefore, we try to keep all other sectors as simple as possible. Not
explicitly modelling the hiring and ﬁring decisions of the capital goods producer
has two main implications. First, there are no wage payments from the capital
goods producer to households. However, in order to close the model, all revenues
of the capital goods producer are channeled back to the households through divi-
dends on the index bonds. Second, the capital goods producer is never rationed on
its input markets, in particular on the labor market. The qualitative implication
of explicitly capturing the capital goods producer's hiring process would be that
in periods when labor market tightness is high there would be a relatively high
probability that the capital goods producer is rationed on the labor market. Being
rationed the ﬁrm would not be able to deliver the full amount of capital goods
that is demanded by the consumption goods producers. This would slow down
the expansion of these consumption good producers relative to their plans. Such a
qualitative eﬀect is already present in the model since consumption good produc-
ers need to hire labor themselves whenever they want to expand their production.
Through this channel a tight labor market has already a hampering eﬀect on ﬁrms'
expansion and potential rationing of the capital goods producer would not add a
qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀect.
2.2.5 Investment and Vintage Choice
If consumption good producers have a target output level which cannot be pro-
duced with their current capital stock, they acquire new capital. To this end, a
consumption goods ﬁrm has to choose from the set of available vintages. For the
decision in which vintage to invest the complementarity between speciﬁc skills and
technology plays an important role: due to the inertia of the speciﬁc skill adap-
tation, the eﬀective productivity of a vintage with Av > Bi,t is initially below its
quality. It converges to Av over time as the speciﬁc skills of workers at the ﬁrm
catch up to the quality of the vintage. Therefore, the ﬁrm computes a discounted
sum of estimated eﬀective productivities over a ﬁxed time horizon S. The speciﬁc
skill evolution is estimated for each time step within [t, t + S] using (3), where
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the ﬁrm inserts its average speciﬁc skill values. A logit choice model based on the
ratio of the estimated eﬀective productivity and price for each available vintage
determines which vintage is ordered.
Capital goods are produced on demand, and as consumption goods produc-
ers may ﬁnd it more suitable for their production plans not to employ the latest
vintages, the capital good producer keeps on delivering also older vintages as the
technology frontier grows. Note, that the way we model the capital good producer
it is a proxy for a more diﬀerentiated market with diﬀerent ﬁrms supplying dif-
ferent vintages. In this sense, we capture vertical diﬀerentiation in the supply of
capital goods. Having an elaborated vintage supply is crucial for our contribution
given that the dynamics of the model unfold through the interaction of heteroge-
neous labor and capital as inputs to competing consumption goods producers. In
particular, our approach allows to capture the eﬀects of the skill endowment in a
region on the vintage choice of ﬁrms and therefore on local technological change,
which is an important mechanism in our analysis.
2.2.6 Labor Market Interaction
If the current workforce of a ﬁrm is not suﬃcient to produce its target output, the
ﬁrm posts vacancies for production workers. The wage it oﬀers is a combination
of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage oﬀer w˜Oi,t and a centrally determined wage component w
U
t .
The ﬁrm speciﬁc wage oﬀer has two constituent parts. The ﬁrst part is the
market driven base wage wbasei,t . The base wage is paid per unit of (expected)
speciﬁc skills of the worker. If the ﬁrm cannot ﬁll its vacancies and the number of
unﬁlled vacancies exceeds some threshold v > 0 the ﬁrm raises the base wage oﬀer
by a fraction ϕ to attract more workers, i.e.
wbasei,t+1 = (1 + ϕ)w
base
i,t . (5)
The second part of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage oﬀer is related to an applicant's expected
level of speciﬁc skills. Since the speciﬁc skills represent the (maximal) productiv-
ity of the employees, the wage wi,t is higher for higher (expected) speciﬁc skills.
Because the speciﬁc skill level of a job applicants is not observable ﬁrms use the
average speciﬁc skills of all their employees to estimate that skill level and would
oﬀer a wage of
w˜Oi,t = w
base
i,t ×min[Ai,tB¯i,t−1] (6)
where B¯i,t−1 are the average speciﬁc skills of all employees in the ﬁrm. A ﬁrm can
observe the speciﬁc skill levels of all its current employees, however, this informa-
tion will not be transferred to a competitor in case a worker applies there.
The second wage component wUt is determined by a labor union and is, there-
fore, the same for all ﬁrms. The aim of the union is to equalize the wage inequality
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that emerges from ﬁrms' heterogeneity with respect to productivity. Furthermore,
the workers should beneﬁt from the productivity gains in the economy and should
be compensated for real income losses due to inﬂation. Altogether, we assume
that the union wage is adjusted over time by
wUt = w
U
t−1 (1 + max [0, p¯it + g¯t]) , (7)
where p¯it is the mean monthly inﬂation rate and g¯t the average economy-wide
productivity growth per month, both averaged over the last year. The actual
wage oﬀer of a ﬁrm is then
wOi,t = (1− λCt )w˜Oi,t + λCwUt , (8)
where λCt ∈ [0, 1] captures the level of centralization in the wage determination.
Note that this wage setting is a reduced form representation of a bargaining process
between ﬁrms and the labor union, where λCt is a time variant policy parameter
that represents the negotiation power of the labor union.
Similarly, we assume that the adjustment of wages of incumbent workers de-
pends on the level of wage centralization. Formally, we have for the wage of a
worker h that works for employer i in the two consecutive periods t− 1 and t
wh,i,t = wh,i,t−1(1 + max
[
0, g¯t + λ
C
t p¯it
]
). (9)
Thus, if the wages are determined fully decentralized, then the wages of incum-
bent workers increase with the speed of productivity growth. If, however, the
wages become more centralized, then wage adjustment of incumbent workers bet-
ter accounts for inﬂation. In case of full centralization, all wages of incumbent
workers correspond to the union wage wUt .
An unemployed worker considers the wage oﬀers posted by a random sample
of searching ﬁrms and compares them with her reservation wage wRh,t. A worker h
only applies to ﬁrm i if it makes a wage oﬀer wOi,t > w
R
h,t.
The level of the reservation wage is determined by the current wage if the worker
is employed, and in case of an unemployed worker by her previous wage, where the
reservation wage declines with the duration of unemployment. The reservation
wage never falls below the level of unemployment beneﬁts. If the unemployed
worker receives one or more job oﬀers she accepts the job oﬀer with the highest
wage oﬀer. In case she does not receive any job oﬀers she remains unemployed.
In case the workforce of a ﬁrm is too large relative to its target output level,
the ﬁrm adjusts its number of workers. The set of dismissed workers is random.
Additionally, there is a small probability for each worker-employee match to be
separated in each period. This should capture job separations due to reasons not
explicitly modeled.
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2.2.7 Consumption Goods Market Interaction
The consumption goods market is represented by a mall at which the consumption
goods producers can oﬀer and sell their products to their customers. Households
go shopping once a week and try to spend their entire weekly consumption budget
for one good. The consumption budget is determined using a (piecewise) linear
consumption rule according to the buﬀer-stock approach (see Carroll, 1997; Allen
and Carroll, 2001). At the beginning of their shopping procedure they get informa-
tion about the prices of all available goods at the mall, but they get no information
about the available quantities. The decision which good to buy is described using
a logit-choice model with strong empirical foundation in the Marketing literature
(see, e.g., Malhotra, 1984). We assume the most important factor governing the
consumers choice is the price sensitivity of consumers and therefore the intensity
of competition between the consumption good producers.
The consumption requests for the diﬀerent goods are collected by the mall and,
if the total demand for one good exceeds its mall inventory level then the mall has
to ration the demand. In this case the mall sets a rationing quota corresponding to
the percentage of the total demand that can be satisﬁed with the available goods.
Each household receives the indicated percentage of the requested consumption
good.
After the shopping activity, rationed households may still have parts of their
consumption budget available. Those households have the opportunity to spend
the remaining budget for another good in a second shopping loop. In this case the
shopping process is repeated as described above.
The production of the consumption goods ﬁrm follows a ﬁxed time schedule
with ﬁxed production and delivery dates. Even if the mall stock is completely sold
out it can only be reﬁlled at the ﬁxed delivery date. Consequently, all the demand
that exceeds the expected value of the monthly sales plus the additional buﬀer
cannot be satisﬁed.
2.3 Parametrization and Validation
In order to determine the values and ranges of parameters to be used in the policy
experiments we follow an approach that combines direct estimation of parame-
ters for which empirical observations are available with an indirect calibration
approach. This is done in order to establish conﬁdence in the ability of the model
to capture economic mechanisms which are relevant for real world economic dy-
namics. Standard constellations have been identiﬁed, where values of parameters
are chosen to reﬂect empirical evidence whenever possible and where a large set
of stylized facts can be reproduced. Furthermore, the fact that the development
of the Eurace@Unibi model follows as far as possible the Management Science
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approach, brieﬂy discussed above, provides empirical grounding to individual de-
cision rules, thereby addressing the important point of empirical micro-foundations
for modeled behavior.
The set of macroeconomic stylized facts that have been reproduced by the
standard constellations of the Eurace@Unibi model includes persistent growth, low
positive inﬂation and a number of important business cycle properties: persistent
ﬂuctuations of output; pro-cyclical movement of employment, consumption and
investment, where relative sizes of amplitudes qualitatively match those reported
e.g. in Stock and Watson (1999), counter-cyclical movement of wages and ﬁrm
mark-ups. On the industry level the model generates persistent heterogeneity
in ﬁrm-size, proﬁt rates, productivity and prices in accordance with empirical
observations reported e.g. in Dosi et al. (1997). Also labor market regularities,
like the Beveridge curve, are reproduced by the model with benchmark parameter
constellations. The reader is referred to Dawid et al. (2012) for a more detailed
discussion of this issue. Tables with the list of parameter values used in the
simulations underlying this paper are provided in the Appendix.
3 Policy Analysis
3.1 Experimental Setup
Our simulation experiment addresses the long-term economic implications of a
decentralization of the wage formation process. The starting point of our analysis
is a baseline scenario that describes an economy with a fully centralized wage
setting. Full centralization means that there is a uniform union wage from which
ﬁrms cannot deviate to pay wages that would take ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics into
account. This baseline scenario is contrasted with policy scenarios in which at a
speciﬁc point in time t = TD a decentralization process is initiated that leads to
more ﬂexibility in the wage setting thereby facilitating ﬁrms to deviate from the
centrally set wage.
The narrative of this experimental setup is that the economy is initially char-
acterized by a centralized collective wage setting, and then undergoes substantial
changes in the institutional setup of the labor market and/or a de-unionization of
the labor force that leads to less centralization in the wage formation process. The
policy scenarios we analyze diﬀer from each other in terms of the extent to which
reductions in the centralization are realized. In the context of our model, the re-
ductions can be achieved by decreasing the parameter λCt governing the degree of
centralization of the wage bargaining process.
In our experiments, we distinguish three time phases. In the pre-policy phase
0 < t < TD, we assume that the wage formation is fully centralized with λC0 = 1.0,
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which corresponds to the situation observed in the baseline scenario. At period
t = TD, the decentralization process starts through which λCt declines from its
initial level λC0 to a scenario speciﬁc level λ¯
C < 1.0. In order to capture that it
takes some time before the reforms are fully eﬀective, we assume a policy phase
in which λCt decreases gradually until it reaches the target level λ¯
C . We assume
that the adjustment is on a yearly base with step size ∆λC . Thus, the policy phase
covers the period from t = TD to t = T¯D, where
T¯D = TD + 12 ·
⌈
λC0 − λ¯C
∆λC
⌉
. (10)
All following periods t > T¯D constitute the post-policy phase. Put formally, the
evolution of λCt can be described by
λCt =

λC0 t < T
D,
λCt−1 T
D ≤ t < T¯D and t mod 12 6= 0,
λCt−1 −∆λC TD ≤ t < T¯D and t mod 12 = 0,
λ¯C t ≥ T¯D.
(11)
Since we focus on a long-term perspective, we consider the eﬀects of a decen-
tralization of the wage formation emerging after a relatively long time horizon of
1000 months. Moreover, we apply the policy treatment after a pre-policy phase of
1000 iterations (i.e. TD = 1000) in order to ensure that no transient eﬀects distort
our policy analysis. Overall, we consider a time horizon of 2000 iterations where
the pre-policy phase is used as transient period and will not be considered in the
following analysis.
Besides the baseline scenario in which the wage setting is kept fully centralized
over the full time horizon, we explore 10 policy scenarios with diﬀerent target levels
λ¯C . The analyzed values range from λ¯C = 0 corresponding to a scenario with full
decentralization to λ¯C = 0.9 representing a high level of centralization, with a
step size of 0.1 in between. We run for each of the 11 scenarios 100 Montecarlo
simulations.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 The baseline scenario
We start the discussion of our results with a brief description of some key char-
acteristics of our baseline scenario where the wage setting is kept fully centralized
over the full time horizon. Once the behavior of the baseline model is described,
we will go into the policy analysis applying the decentralization policies to our
model.
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Figure 1: Time series of total output (a), and productivity (b) of the baseline
scenario.
Figure 1 shows time series for aggregate output (panel a) and productivity
(panel b). The economy features an increase in total output driven by a con-
stant increase in productivity. The average annual growth rate is around 1.4%
for total output and 1.44% for productivity. Figure 2 shows the time series for
the unemployment rate (panel a) and the Herﬁndahl index (panel b)  a measure
for industry concentration. Panel (a) indicates a stationary unemployment rate
that ﬂuctuates around a level of 11%. The Herﬁndahl index stays in a corridor
between 0.0155 and 0.017. Given that the model has been set up with 80 ﬁrms,
the simulated values for the Herﬁndahl index suggest a competitive industry with
only a moderate tendency towards market concentration.6 Altogether, the base-
line scenario with a fully centralized wage formation describes an economy with
a competitive industry characterized by technology-driven economic growth and
persistent unemployment.
3.2.2 The long-term eﬀects of a decentralized wage setting
Let us ﬁrst consider the eﬀects of a less centralized wage setting on growth and
employment. In order to illustrate the simulation outcomes we use boxplots where
each boxplot represents the distribution of a variable over the 100 batch runs for
the considered levels of de-centralization from from 0% (baseline scenario) to 100%
(full de-centralization). Figure 3 shows boxplots for the average annual growth
6In fact, the smallest possible Herﬁndahl index in an industry with 80 is 0.0125, describing a
situation in which all 80 ﬁrms have the same market share.
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Figure 2: Time series of unemployment rate (a), and Herﬁndahl index (b) for the
baseline scenario.
rate of total output (left panel) and the unemployment rate. The growth rate is
computed for the entire time horizon and the unemployment rate is the average
over the last 20 months.7
From Figure 3 (a) one can see that a decentralization of the wage setting
results in a negative growth eﬀect. The size of the eﬀect is declining in the degree
of ﬂexibility meaning that a small to medium change in de-centralization causes
stronger growth reductions whereas any further ﬂexibility in the wage setting leads
only to minor additional losses in output growth. Panel (b) demonstrates that the
lower growth is not driven by negative employment eﬀects. The reduction in the
centralization of the wage setting does not change the unemployment rate in the
long run.
Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀects of an increasing de-centralization on inequality,
where panel (a) depicts the eﬀect on wage inequality, and panel (b) the eﬀect on
income inequality. Since wage inequality considers only labor income of employed
households and, at the same time, we do not distinguish diﬀerent types of workers,
the inequality of wages is zero when wages are collectively negotiated. In fact,
every worker receives the same labor income regardless of the characteristics of
the employer or the tenure of the job. With an increasing decentralization of the
wage setting process, however, ﬁrms have more scope to oﬀer wages that reﬂect
speciﬁc properties of the ﬁrm such as the ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity proﬁle and the
7Note that for expositional convenience the scale used for the boxplots describes a variation
from (1− λ¯C)× 100.
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of a de-centralization on average output growth (a), and the
unemployment rate at the end of the simulations (b).
perceived tightness the ﬁrm faces on the labor market. Consequently, the more
decentralized the wage setting becomes, the more individualized are the wages
resulting in an increasing wage inequality. Qualitatively, there is a similar picture
for income inequality, which, besides wages, also includes unemployment beneﬁts
and capital income. Income inequality, which is already present in case of fully
centralized wages, tends to increase with a larger decentralization, however only
up to a degree of decentralization of 60%. After that income inequality slightly
decreases as the wage setting becomes more decentralized.
Now, we turn to the implications of a de-centralized wage setting process for
industry dynamics. Panel (a) of Figure 5 shows how the industry concentration is
aﬀected by a change in the wage centralization. One can see that the Herﬁndahl
index is the highest in the baseline scenario and decreases as the wage setting
becomes less concentrated. Thus, de-centralization is associated with less industry
concentration in the long run. Panel (b) of that ﬁgure depicts the average number
of ranks a ﬁrm moves up or down along the order by ﬁrm size in each period, which
we use as an indicator for the dynamics of market shares. The ﬁgure suggests that
the ﬁrm order shows the highest persistence in the baseline scenario and otherwise
follows an inverse U-shaped relation, i.e. the volatility of market shares is the
highest at medium levels of wage centralization.
In Figure 6 (a) we show the average size of the capital stock of ﬁrms at the
end of the simulation. Apparently, the average capital stock of ﬁrms is the largest
in the baseline scenario in which we have observed the highest output growth.
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of a de-centralization on inequality of wages (a), and income (b)
at the end of the simulation (measured as percentage standard deviation).
This gives a clear indication that the higher long-term growth under a centralized
wage setting emerges through heavier overall investments by ﬁrms giving rise to
larger capital stocks and faster replacement of old vintages. As a result, there is a
higher productivity growth in the economy, which is indeed evidenced in panel (b)
plotting the annual growth rate of the productivity of ﬁrms employed capital stock.
This suggests that the negative eﬀect of a de-centralization on output growth is
driven by a slower pace of technical change, which in turn is the consequence of
less capital investments of ﬁrms.
What stands behind these observations? First of all, it should be noted that
ﬁrms compete on two markets, the goods market and the labor market. On the
goods market, ﬁrms compete on prices to generate demand, where the cost struc-
ture of a ﬁrm eventually determines whether it is proﬁtable to set a higher or
a lower price compared to the competitors. On the labor market, ﬁrms bid for
workers and the main distinguishing feature between ﬁrms is the wage that they
oﬀer to potential applicants.
A fully centralized wage has two implications. First, the competition on the
labor market is turned oﬀ as ﬁrms can only oﬀer the uniform union wage in the
hiring process. In fact, if there are no diﬀerences in the wage oﬀer, then job
seekers are indiﬀerent between any potential employer and choose the ﬁrm to apply
randomly. The second implication is that uniform wages give ﬁrms with a high
productivity a strong competitive advantage in the goods market. If wages are fully
equal, the unit labor costs of a ﬁrm are entirely determined by its productivity,
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of a de-centralization on the Herﬁndahl index at the end of the
simulation (a), and the ﬁrm size dynamics measured by ﬁrms' average change per
period of ranks in the ﬁrm order determined by output size (b).
which enables high-tech ﬁrms to set prices more aggressively.
If, in contrast, the wage setting becomes more de-centralized, then wages be-
come increasingly correlated with the productivity level of ﬁrms. This, however,
weakens the cost advantage of high-tech ﬁrms as the higher wages counteract the
cost-reducing eﬀects of a higher productivity. At the same time, more ﬂexibility
in the wage setting strengthens the importance of base wage oﬀers for the level
of unit labor costs. As described in Section 2.2.6, the base wage oﬀer reﬂects the
wage a ﬁrm is willing to pay per expected unit of productivity and has therefore
a positive impact on labor unit costs. It is driven by the competition on the labor
market and tends to be higher for those ﬁrms that have historically faced more
problems to ﬁll open vacancies.
Hence, a change in the degree of wage centralization changes the relative im-
portance of two channels driving the unit costs of ﬁrms. But how does a shift in
the cost mechanisms aﬀect the cost and price advantage of high-tech ﬁrms? In
order to make a systematic comparison of high- and low-tech ﬁrms, we show in
the following boxplots for diﬀerent variables the ratios between high- and low-tech
ﬁrms. We characterize a ﬁrm as high-tech ﬁrm if the productivity of its employed
capital stock is above the median productivity in the ﬁrm population. A ratio
above 1.0 implies that the considered variable is on average higher for high-tech
ﬁrms than for low-tech ﬁrms. Figure 7 (a) depicts the price ratio between the two
types of ﬁrms. One can see that high-tech ﬁrms set their prices more aggressively
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of a de-centralization on the average size of ﬁrms' capital stock
(a), and the average productivity growth in the economy (b).
in comparison to low-tech ﬁrms. The price gap is the largest under a fully central-
ized wage regime. A qualitatively similar picture can be observed for the relative
unit labor costs (panel b). The cost advantage of high-tech ﬁrms is also decreasing
in the degree of de-centralization. Apparently, high-tech ﬁrms forfeit parts of their
competitive advantage when the wage setting is shifted from full centralization to
more ﬂexible wage regimes.
In Figure 8 (a) and (b), we show the main determinants of the unit labor costs.
Panel (a) plots the eﬀect of a de-centralization on the relative productivity, where
we consider the eﬀective productivity deﬁned as the minimum of the productivity
of a ﬁrm's capital stock and the mean speciﬁc skills of workers of that ﬁrm. Again,
the most pronounced diﬀerences between the two types of ﬁrms can be found under
full centralization, where already a small ﬂexibilization of the wage setting leads
to substantial reductions in the productivity gap. In panel (b), we demonstrate
the relative base wage oﬀers.8 Here, one can see that as long as the wages are suf-
ﬁciently centralized, high-tech ﬁrms have on average larger base wage oﬀers than
low-tech ﬁrms. This can be explained by the productivity-driven cost advantage
translating into more labor market activities of those ﬁrms which drive up their
base wage oﬀers over time. With an increasing de-centralization, however, wages
become more heterogeneous among ﬁrms introducing the positive correlation be-
tween productivity and wages. In this situation, low-tech ﬁrms face an inherent
8Note that the base wage oﬀer is not depicted for the baseline scenario as this variable is not
determined under full wage centralization.
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Figure 7: Eﬀect of a de-centralization on the ratio of high- and low-tech ﬁrms for
prices (a), and unit labor costs (b).
disadvantage on the labor market and have to set higher base wage oﬀers in order
to still be able to successfully bid for workers. As a result, for higher levels of de-
centralization, we observe that the base wage oﬀers are higher for low-tech ﬁrms,
which in turn contributes to larger unit labor costs in these scenarios.
Overall, one can conclude that in case of a more centralized wage formation the
cost and price advantages of high-tech ﬁrms are directly driven by their produc-
tivity advantage, whereas for a more de-centralized wage setting the competitive
advantage of high-tech ﬁrms arises through the competition on the labor mar-
ket in which high-tech ﬁrms can oﬀer relatively high wages without substantially
impairing their unit costs.
Finally, in Figure 8 (c) and (d), we demonstrate the relative size of the capital
stock of high- and low-tech ﬁrms as well as their relative outputs. Again, in both
ﬁgures, the largest diﬀerence between high- and low-tech ﬁrms can be observed in
case of full wage centralization. A notable observation is, however, that under full
wage centralization output and capital of high-tech ﬁrms are about 50% higher
than output and capital of low-tech ﬁrms, whereas the productivity of high-tech
ﬁrms exceeds the one of low-tech ﬁrms only by around 8%. This clearly indicates
that the higher aggregate growth and the higher market concentration under wage
centralization is driven by a relative growth of high-tech ﬁrms induced by their
productivity-driven cost advantage. This cost advantage enables them to set prices
more aggressively compared to their low-tech competitors, which in turn leads to
more capital investments and larger output growth of these ﬁrms in the long run.
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Figure 8: Eﬀect of a de-centralization on the ratio between high- and low-tech
ﬁrms for eﬀective productivity (a), base wage oﬀers (b), size of capital stocks (c),
and output (d).
If wages are determined in a decentralized manner, then high-tech ﬁrms have still
a cost advantage but it is weaker than the one under full wage centralization. As
a result, there is less relative output growth of high-tech ﬁrms such that more of
the productive resources of the economy are employed by low-tech ﬁrms which
eventually gives rise to lower long-term growth of aggregate output.
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4 Discussions and Conclusions
There has been a secular decline in the unionization of labor markets and cover-
age of workers with collective agreements. Moreover, collective agreements have
become more ﬂexible in the sense that opening clauses allow ﬁrms to deviate from
regional or sectoral agreements to a larger extent than previously. It has been
argued that while theses changes in the wage setting process of economies has
been contributing to larger wage inequality, it should also have increased ﬁrms'
competitiveness fostering economic growth.
In our contribution, we scrutinize this narrative. To this end, we analyze the
eﬀect of centralized versus de-centralized wage setting arrangements in a closed
agent-based macro-economic model. In contrast to previous analyses, we incorpo-
rate not only the eﬀect that de-centralized wage setting has on ﬁrms' competitive-
ness on the labor market, but also look into the eﬀect it has on ﬁrms' competitive-
ness in the product market. We show that more wage ﬂexibility indeed increases
wage and income inequality. It has, however, a negative eﬀect on output growth.
De-centralized wages curb the cost advantage that high-tech ﬁrms have. Under
centralized wages, high-tech ﬁrms can charge lower prices than their competitors
which enables them to capture a larger market share spurring investments in their
capital stock. The large and more up-to date capital stocks of the well performing
high-tech ﬁrms in a market with centralized wages lead to higher growth rates
than one gets in a market with de-centralized wages in which capital investments
are spread among more ﬁrms but are overall lower.
We are aware that our analysis rests on a range of modeling assumptions and
calibration choices that we had to make. Nevertheless, it suggests that one should
be careful with overhasty policy conclusions on the beneﬁts of de-unionized labor
markets. More decentralized wage setting systems do appear to increase income
inequality but they may not necessarily increase growth.
A Appendix
Table 1 gives an overview over the most important model parameters. Table 2
shows the set-up of the model with respect to diﬀerent agent types.
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Table 1: Values of selected parameters.
Parameter Description Value
u Wage replacement rate 0.55
Φ Target wealth/income ratio 16.67
κ Adjustment wealth/income ratio 0.01
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.01
χ Service level for the expected demand 0.8
γC Intensity of consumer choice 16.0
ρ Discount rate 0.02
S Firm time horizon in months 24
∆qinv Technological progress 0.05
λ Bargaining power of the capital goods producer 0.5
γv Logit parameter for vintage choice 30.0
ϕ Wage update 0.005
v Number of unﬁlled vacancies triggering wage update 2
ψ Reservation wage update 0.1
αD Number applications per day 1
αT Total number applications per month 6
χS Speciﬁc skills adaptation speed for low skilled workers 0.03703
τ I Income tax rate 0.065
Table 2: Number of agents.
Agent type Number
Households 1600
Consumption good ﬁrms 80
Capital good ﬁrm 1
Banks 2
Government 1
Central bank 1
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